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ECONOMIC theory might contribute in two possible ways to the de-
velopment of a satisfactory measure or set of measures of concen-
tration. The theory of price and general competitive strategy under
conditions of oligopoly might provide guidance for choosing the
measure that best distinguishes industries according to differences
in their methods of competition. While I am not too familiar with
this branch of economic theory, I doubt if it could be of much use
at the present stage of its development, when—under the impact of
Von Neumann's and Morgenstern's work on the general theory of
strategy—_it is in a state of ferment. Furthermore, I am not at all
convinced that our main purpose in measuring concentration is(or
should be) to distinguish among industries or economies according
to their methods of price setting and competition. The public are
concerned about industrial concentration, because they are con-
cerned about its economic and political effects. The economist
should, therefore, analyze at least the economic effects and assess
their importance. Accordingly, measures of concentration should be
evolved with a view to their usefulness in accomplishing this task.
This criterion is very different from the criterion mentioned above,
since the methods of price setting and competition brought about
by concentration are neither the only nor necessarily the most im-
portant effects of concentration. Hence, the second possible contri-
bution of economic theory is to make hypotheses as to the various
effects of concentration. By so doing, it will indicate the various uses
to which measures of concentration will be put and thus help to
develop the most satisfactory measure.
I shall concentrate on this latter relation, and try to give a de-
tailed statement of the various effects that the theorist would expect
concentration to have. Also, I shall use this opportunity to make a
few criticisms of some of the existing measures of concentration.
The discussion of the effects of concentration will have the useful
by-product of providing an appraisal of some of the alternative
measures of oligopoly power. Let us remember that measures of con-
centration, whether they try to measure the concentration of owner-
ship, profits, or market policies within an industry, are only one
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among many possible indexes of oligopoly power. Another set of
indexes aims at measuring oligopoly power by its effects. In this
category belong the indexes developed by Lerner, Bain, Morgan,
Papandreou, to mention only a few. I propose to deal with some of
these at least in passing.
In discussions of the effects of industrial concentration, it is cus-
tomary to distinguish between the distributive effects and the effects
on the efficiency of economic organization; but each of these can be
broken down yet further. In the case of the distributive effects of
concentration, it is desirable to distinguish the effect of concentra-
tion on income distribution from its effect on the distribution of
social and political power. In the case of the efficiency effects, the
effects of concentration on resource allocation are usually stressed.
Here we must distinguish the effects on resource and output alloca-
tion among different firms and industries from the effects on the way
in which each individual firm combines its different productive
resources. Furthermore, concentration may also influence the firm's
internal administrative and engineering efficiency, and may affect
technological progress. These six effects can be called the direct
effects of concentration. Through its influence on income distribu-
tion, general efficiency (and hence labor productivity), and techno-
logical progress, concentration may also influence the level of em-
ployment; but since this is an indirect effect, wrought through the
direct effects mentioned above, it will not be discussed further.
1. Effect on Income Distribution
INnus-FRLAL concentration has been attacked chiefly because of its
effect on income distribution. Some attack it on equalitarian grounds,
because concentration is generally believed to enhance the inequal-
ity of income distribution. Others feel that it is inequitable for any-
one to receive a higher income than is necessary to call forth the
supply of his type of services in the socially desirable quantities. In
general, many resent the fact that in a world of monopolies and
countermonopolies inequalities of income arise that have no eco-
nomic justification or explanation but are caused by disparities in
bargaining power. Furthermore, income distribution is not a matter
of equity alone. Since it is one of the determinants of specialization
and of the flow of primary resources into different uses, one can
argue that income distribution is also a matter of efficiency_an
efficient income distribution being defined as one that would bring
about an efficient allocation of resources.
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Industrial concentration may affect income distribution in a
variety of ways. Concentration influences the profit margins and
prices charged in product markets as well as the prices paid for
resources in factor markets; and it can also affect income distribu-
tion by making it more expensive and generally more difficult for
newcomers to enter the industry.
Statistical measures of the effects of concentration on income dis-
tribution have not yet been developed. An index, however, is pro-
vided by Bain's index of profit rates. In fact, it has been claimed
that Bain's index measures not only this single effect of concentration
but is a suitable index of concentration or oligopoly power itself.
The aim of all concentration, it might be argued, is monopoly profit;
and therefore the best way of measuring concentration is to measure
the extent to which it achieves this aim. This argument would be
valid if it were found that the other effects of oligopoly power were
exerted through the same factors that influence profits and in a
similar way.
2. Effect on Distribution of Power
THE next effect of industrial concentration I want to deal with is
its effect on the distribution of social and political power. I shall
consider this effect separately, partly because the distribution of
social and political power is important quite aside from the effects
it may have on income distribution, partly because concentration
may affect income distribution and the distribution of social power
in different ways, and partly also because value judgments may be
different with respect to the two distributions.
It is sometimes argued, for example, that the increased concen-
tration of business and of organized labor on the two sides of the
labor market have just about offset each other as far as their effect on
income distribution is concerned. If this is so, we would neverthe-
less regard the advent of collective bargaining on a nationwide scale
as of the utmost political, social, and economic importance. Again,
in our present-day society, when the power of the state is great and
increasing, the individual's protection against abuses of this power
might well lie in the social power of organized economic and other
groups; and in this connection—as well as in many other connec-
tions—the political scientist might well be interested not only in
the degree of concentration but also in how concentration is dis-
tributed among different social groups and economic interests.
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3. Effect on Resource Allocation
THE next two effects of concentration have to do with resource
allocation. Under pure competition, each firm would combine its
resources in the best (socially most desirable) proportions and pro-
duce an output that stands in the correct (socially most desirable)
relation to the output of all other firms and industries, because per-
fectly competitive prices reflect relative scarcities and demands cor-
rectly, and because each firm, guided by these prices, would aim at
maximum profits.
Neither of these conditions is likely to be fulfilled under oligop-
oly.' When oligopolists sell at prices above marginal cost and oligop-
sonists buy at prices below marginal value, relative prices become
unreliable as indexes of relative scarcities and relative demands;
and the producers, whose policies are guided by market prices, may
make socially undesirable decisions. In particular, too little will be
produced and too few resources utilized in industries with high
margins;2 and too much will be produced and too many resources
utilized in industries with low margins.
This is the chief effect of concentration on allocation; but it
should be noted that it is the result of market imperfection in gen-
eral rather than of concentration alone, which is only one of the
many manifestations (or causes) of market imperfection. Further-
more, misallocation of resources is caused, not by the size of profit
margins, but by the fact that they differ sharply among industries—
though the best practical way of narrowing this difference might
nevertheless be to lower the average profit margin.
To express the importance of this effect of concentration or of
market imperfection we would want, ideally, a measure of society's
loss chargeable to misallocation of resources. But we have hardly
begun to take the first step toward laying the conceptual founda-
tions on which statistical estimates of such social loss might be
based.8 In the interim, the best we can do is to use the margin be-
tween price and marginal cost as an index of this loss—or rather,
some parameter of the frequency distribution of this margin. This is
Lerner's well-known index of the degree of monopoly. A general
1Thecondition of profit maximization is discussed in section 5 below.
2Unlessotherwise stated,the terms "margin" and 'profit margin" refer
throughout this paper to the margin between price and marginal cost, or be-
tween marginal value and price.
SSeethe work of Gerard Debren in several Cowles Commission "Discussion
Papers" privately circulated.
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appraisal of this index will be given later, but I shall discuss some
of the specific objections to it here.
One objection to Lerner's index of monopoly power is that its
practical application presents formidable problems, because firms
do not use marginal cost as an operational concept. The second
objection is that Lerner's index shows the degree of monopoly
power only in the product market and ignores the possibility of the
firm's oligopsony power in factor markets.
Both these difficulties, however, can easily be resolved in certain
cases. In firms whose output varies in proportion with the input of
variable factors(i.e. where the variable factors have fixed produc-
tion coefficients) the margin between price and average variable
cost (an operational concept!) can be used as an index of market
imperfection both in the market where the firm sells and in the
markets where it buys. 1n such firms, average variable cost and
marginal cost would coincide if it were not for imperfect competi-
tion in factor markets; and the difference between average variable
and marginal costs measures the weighted average degree of market
imperfection faced by the firm in the factor markets. By adding
this çlifference to the difference between marginal cost and price,
which measures market imperfection in the product market, we
obtain the margin between average variable cost and price as a
measure of market imperfection in both product and factor markets.
Dean's cost studies suggest that the special condition under which
this amended form of Lerner's index could be used occurs in many
industries.
A third objection to Lerner's index is that it measures market
imperfection rather than monopoly or oligopoly power. The mar-
gin between price and marginal cost would not be zero even in the
complete absence of oligopoly, which is only one of several factors
that account for this margin. Accordingly, to measure the effects of
oligopoly alone, two further indexes were developed, one by Roth-
schild and the other (along lines suggested by Triffin and Morgan)
by Papandreou.5
The second effect of concentration on resource allocation also
4 Lerner himself, unlike most other advocates of his index, was fully aware of
this objection and met it in a way similar to that suggested in the next paragraph.
5 Cl. K. W. Rothschild, 'The Degree of Monopoly," Economica, February
1942, pp. 214-239; Theodore Morgan, "A Measure of Monopoly in Selling,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1946, pp. 461-463; A. G. Papandreou, "Mar-
ket Structure and Monopoly Power," American Economic Review, September
1949, pp. 883-897.
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results from the gap between price and marginal cost or marginal
value; but it has to do with the proportions in which the individual
firm combines its different productive resources. In short, it has to
do with the method of production adopted by the firm. The margin
between the price and marginal cost of productive resources tends
to keep the socially most desirable method of production from be-
ing also the cheapest; and owing to the pyramiding of margins at
successive stages of production, it might lead to a general bias
against the use of capital equipment and other manufactured fac-
tors of production. Misallocation of this type must be distinguished
from misallocation of the first type, discussed in the previous sec-
tion, because, unlike the first type, it increases both with the aver-
age degree of market imperfection and with its dispersion, and also
because vertical integration as well as bilateral concentration in
factor markets are likely to restore the correspondence between the
social desirability and the money cost of different methods of
production.°
No attempts have as yet been made to appraise the importance
of this type of misallocation and the social loss resulting from it,
but the approach used in the case discussed in the last section must
also be used here. Lerner's index, however, or any similar index is
not applicable, because it cannot show the corrective influence of
vertical integration or bilateral concentration.
4. Effect on Eflciency of the Firm
CONCENTRATION also affects the firm's internal administrative and
engineering efficiency. Since this effect is exerted through the influ-
ence of concentration on the entrepreneur's desire to maximize
profits, its consideration must be prefaced by a short discussion of
profit maximization.
Under pure competition, the profit of the most profitable firm
is supposed to be kept at or near zero by the free entry of new-
comers. All the less profitable firms therefore are suffering a loss;
and it is the whip-hand of this loss that keeps each entrepreneur on
his toes and, so to speak, forces him to maximize his profit. By con-
trast, when restraints on or costs of entry to a monopolistic or oligop-
olistic market suspend the operation of the competitive forces that
would tend to eliminate profits, then the failure to maximize profit
6Cf.Lionel W. McKenzie, "Ideal Output and the Interdependence of Firms,"
Economic Journal, December 1951,pp.785-803. See also my Welfare and Corn.
petition (Irwin, 1951),pp.356-363 and 437-438.
106ECONOMIC THEORY AND CONCENTRATION MEASUREMENT
may lead merely to lower-than-maximum profits instead of to the
punishment of losses. The desire for profit may be strong enough,
of course, to render even the threat of low profits enough to call
forth the utmost effort to maximize profits; but the widespread
criticism of the assumption of profit maximization suggests that
there must be many markets in our economy in which the restraint
on entry and consequent guarantee of monopoly profits removes or
at least greatly weakens the desire to maximize profits.
What is the significance of the oligopolist's failure to maximize
profits from the point of view of efficiency? I argued in section 3
that under imperfect competition even profit maximizing behavior
would lead to inefficient resource allocation; and this situation may
be rendered still worse by the firm's failure to maximize profits.7
But, and this is more important. failure to maximize profits causes
inefficiency also in another sense. It can be shown that profit max-
imization calls for efficiency in the internal administration and engi-
neering setup of the firm, whatever the nature and structure of the
markets in which the firm operates. Profit maximization therefore
is desirable even if market imperfection interferes with efficient
resource allocation; and it may well be one of the most important
effects of concentration that by weakening the incentive to maxi-
mize profits it also weakens the management's incentive to enforce
and maintain the firm's internal efficiency.
The internal inefficiency of the firm may take a variety of forms.
On the technical side it may involve offering the consumer an un-
satisfactory product, producing a given product with wasteful and
old-fashioned methods, or simply not keeping up with technological
progress. On the administrative side it may mean plain bad admin-
istration, the inadequate coordination of the firm's different activities
and plants, or the unnecessary and wasteful expansion of the firm's
administrative bureaucracy.
It is to be noted that profit maximization is a sufficient but not a
necessary condition of the maintenance of internal efficiency in the
firm. Management may be interested in efficiency per se, quite apart
from its effect on profits; or, to put it differently, management may
be interested in minimizing costs even if it is not anxious to max-
imize profits. I am rather skeptical, however, about this type of
argument; and the experience of this country during World War II
with the cost-plus type of contract suggests strongly that the profit
7Itcould conceivably lead also to better allocation, but this does not seem
very likely.
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motive is still the best if not the only guarantee of efficiency in
the firm.
So far as I am aware, no attempts have been made to measure
this effect of concentration.
5. Effect on Rate of Technological Progress
IN THE last two sections we were concerned with the effect of con-
centration on efficiency in a static sense and on the firm's induce-
ment to keep step with the progress of its competitors. But con-
centration also affects the rate of technological progress, even though
the importance and the direction of this influence is a matter of
controversy. There is agreement only on the fact that basic scien-
tific research has in our day become a very expensive operation,
which can be indulged in only by large firms and well-endowed
universities. Big business is therefore held to promote basic scientific
progress.
Entirely separate from this is the problem of how soon a given
state of scientific knowledge or a given rate of scientific progress
will be put to industrial use. Here again bigness plays a role, al-
though there are several conflicting factors. To begin with, the large
firm has a greater inducement than the small firm to introduce
methods of production requiring a high capital investment8 and
whenever improved productive methods happen also to require a
heavy investment, it is the large firms that will put them into effect
the sooner and the more readily. Secondly, there is the risk factor,
which pulls in the opposite direction. It has been argued that an
oligopolistic market is more risky than a freely competitive one; and
it is also maintained (although on somewhat incomplete evidence)
that large firms are more reluctant to engage in risky ventures than
are small firms. It would follow from this that investment in inno-
vations that involve a risk would be more readily undertaken by
the small firm and in the freely competitive market. Thirdly, new-
comers have more of an inducement than established firms to use
the most up-to-date methods; whereas the adoption of the best
available methods by established firms is governed and often re-
tarded by the rate at which their existing equipment is wearing out.
Since the distinction between established firms and newcomers usu-
ally coincides with that between large and small firms, this factor
also tends to associate faster progress with the small firm. Common
observation suggests that the first factor often has the upper hand
8Forthe reasons see p.iii below.
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over the other two but for a definitive answer we must await here
too a statistical study.
6. Conclusions
WE ARE now ready to draw certain conclusions about the measure-
ment of concentration from this short review of its effects. It ap-
pears, to begin with, that a simple distinction can be drawn between
measures of concentration on the one hand and all other indexes of
monopoly or oligopoly power on the other hand. Monopoly and
oligopoly consist of a power relation among the sellers or the buyers
in a certain market; and this power relation depends largely on the
number and size distribution of the competing sellers or buyers.
Measures of concentration try to express the number and size dis-
tribution of competitors in terms of a one-parameter index, which
could then be regarded as a direct measure of the degree of oligopoly.9
By contrast, all other indexes and proposed indexes of oligopoly
or monopoly aim at measuring it indirectly by its effects. In view of
the tenuous connection between numbers and size distribution on
the one hand and the resulting oligopoly situation on the other,
there is a great temptation to do this. Unfortunately, however, this
procedure raises other, and I suspect worse, difficulties, which are
due to the great variety of effects that concentration has. If concen-
tration is to be measured by its results, which effect should be
chosen for the role of the measuring rod? The answer would be easy
if one effect were more important than all the others, or if all the
different effects were closely correlated. However, there is good
reason to doubt the latter; and the former is one of the questions
we cannot yet answer.
Bain's index of profit rates therefore must be rejected, I think, as
a general measure of oligopoly power—at least until statistical in-
vestigation has established that the most important influence of
concentration is its effect on income distribution, and that the crea-
tion of monopoly profit is the main aspect of its redistributive effect.
It is true that the size of profits is likely to be correlated with some
of the efficiency effects of concentration; but there is at least one,
which may well be among the most important, with which it is not
correlated. It will be recalled that one result of concentration is the
weakening of the competitive pressure under which the firm max-
imizes profits and maintains its internal efficiency for the sake of
maximizing profits. It is obvious that Bain's index is inadequate as
9See,however, Feilner's discussion of this paper for a three-parameter index.
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a measure of the effect of concentration on the firm's internal ad-
ministrative and engineering efficiency.
Lerner's index must be rejected on similar grounds. This index,
unlike Bain's, is aimed primarily at expressing the effects of concen-
tration on efficiency; and it measures not an ultimate but an inter-
mediate effect: the margin between price and marginal (or average
variable) cost. But since concentration exerts its economic effects
through two channels—margins and obstacles to entry—Lerner's
index is also one-sided. It registers the influence of concentration on
the allocation of output and resources among different firms and
industries and would be acceptable as a general index of concen-
tration only if this were the main effect of concentration. The index
fails altogether to register the firm's interntl efficiency, which has
to do with obstacles to entry; it is an unsatisfactory measure of the
distributive effects, which have to do both with margins and with
obstacles to entry; and it also fails to show the effect of concentra-
tion on technological progress and on the choice of the firm's method
of production. Rothschild's and Papandreou's measures, while inter-
esting in some respects (especially Papandreou's), are also based on
the firm's profit margin and must therefore be rejected on similar
grounds.
7. Standards of Adequacy
WE CAN now at long last consider the proper subject of this Con-
ference: measures of concentration in the strict sense of the word.
Since these do not aim at measuring the effects of concentration,
they can hardly be criticized for inadequacy on that score. But the
foregoing discussion suggests that their main purpose is and must be
to serve as a basis for a systematic statistical appraisal of the effects
of concentration. Theory can only provide a list of these effects and
indicate their nature. Ahead of us is the major task of verifying the
surmises of theory and appraising the importance—absolute and
relative—of each effect of concentration. It is clear that for this task
a good measure of concentration is required; and it is by the standard
of adequacy for this task that measures of concentfation must be
judged.
One of the problems raised is the choice of the most suitable
quantity in terms of which to measure concentration. As far as I am
aware, five such quantities have been suggested: employment, sales,
value added, value of total assets, and "net capital assets." Theoret-
ical considerations are helpful, I think, in making this choice. We
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should expect large firms to use more capital-using and small firms
to employ more labor-using methods of production for at least three
reasons. One is that the scope for using labor-saving machinery in-
creases with size. The second is that large firms are likely to be in a
better bargaining position vis-à-vis the producers of equipment and
therefore obtain the latter at more favorable prices than do small
firms.'° The third reason is that the factor limiting the size of small
firms is usually their limited access to capital, whereas the size of
large firms is limited by various other considerations; and capital
theory suggests that this difference in the limit to size encourages
higher capital-using methods of production in the large firm.h1 Ac-
cordingly, we should expect a measure of concentration based on
employment to understate, and one based on total or "net" capital
assets to overstate the degree of concentration. This would leave
sales and "value added" as the best measures of size; and since
"value added" data are not available at present, we should conclude
that the volume of sales is the most satisfactory basis for measuring
concentration.
The use of sales for this purpose has been criticized, however, on
the ground that it would show horizontal concentration but not
vertical integration. Indeed, if the same index is to measure both
horizontal and vertical integration, then employment, or assets, or—
to take care of the problem raised in the previous paragraph—some
average of employment and assets, would be a more suitable quan-
tity in terms of which to measure the degree of concentration.
It is not at all certain, however, that it is desirable to express both
horizontal and vertical integration with the aid of a single measure
of concentration. If our sole concern were the effect of concentra-
tion on the distribution of income and of social and political power,
a single measure might suffice. But if we are also concerned, as I
think we should be, with the effect of concentration on efficiency,
more than one measure is needed. For some aspects of efficiency we
should expect horizontal and vertical integration to pull in opposite
directions. Horizontal concentration can generally be expected to
worsen efficiency in most respects; but vertical integration is likely
to improve efficiency at least in the firm's choice of a method of pro-
duction and in its combination of the different factors of production.
This was argued in section .Itis not my task to suggest a suitable
index for measuring the degree of vertical integration; but I do
10 This is the bilateral concentration referred to in section . iiScitovsky, op.cit.,Chap. ix, Sec. 4.
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think that if the aim of measuring concentration is to help assess its
economic effects, horizontal and vertical concentration as well as
their measurements should be kept strictly separate.
Another result that emerges from this analysis is the need for a
measure of concentration that would show the fields in which and
the degree to which concentration on one side of a market is matched
by concentration on the other side of the same market. We know
that in some though not all respects the effects of concentration are
offset by the concentration of "countervailing power"; and itis
clearly desirable that measures of concentration should be such as to
enable their users to deal with this problem. I am fully aware of the
difficulties that arise in this connection, mainly from the fact that the
relevant statistics and much of our thinking on these matters are
based on classification by industry; whereas the concept of bilateral
monopoly or countervailing power refers to the individual market.
It is not my task, however, to make concrete suggestions in this
paper; and I shall confine myself to a mere statement of the econo-
mist's needs.
Finally, a few words might be said on the problem of finding a one-
parameter index with which to express the shape of the distribution
of an industry's total sales (or employment, or assets, etc.) among its
members. There have been many attempts to solve this problem. To
mention just a few: the percentage of an industry's total sales (or
employment, etc.) concentrated in a fixed number of its largest
firms—this number varying between four and eight; the number of
the largest firms—or the percentage of all finns they represent—that
among them produce a fixed percentage of the industry's total sales;
the Gini index; the attempt, mentioned by Adelman, to fit a simple
one-parameter function to a cumulated frequency distribution of
size, and to use the parameter of this function as an index of con-
centration.
It is obvious, I think, that economic theory cannot offer much help
in choosing among these and similar alternatives; and the little help
it does provide is largely negative. I doubt, for example, if theory
can help us choose from among the indexes of the type first men-
tioned. So far as I know, oligopoly theory does not tell us the max-
imum number of firms among which competitive behavior will still
be oligopolistic. Similarly and for the same reason, we have no prin-
ciple for choosing the fixed percentage of an industry's sales on
which to base an index of the type mentioned second; nor do we
have a criterion for choosing between the first and the second type.
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As to Gini's index, it must be rejected, I think, because it indicates
only the inequality of size distribution and is unaffected by the total
number of firms; whereas absolute numbers are clearly relevant to
monopoly power. The last-mentioned index, if it can be developed,
appeals to me most; but on the basis of its elegance rather than on
that of economic considerations. I must admit, however, that I am
no specialist on oligopoly theory, which is relevant for choosing
among these alternatives; and I should look for the definitive an-
swer to these problems to Stigler or Feilner, who are specialists on
the theory of oligopoly.
COMMENT
WILLIAM FELLNER, Yale University
SCITOVSKY'S analysis is concerned with how alternative measures of
monopoly and of concentration relate to specific economic and social
problems. I am in general agreement with his conclusions.
So-called measures of monopoly are essentially different from
measures of concentration. Measures of monopoly relate to some
property of monopoly, usually conceived of as an effect of this market
condition. Measures of concentration tell us something about the
likelihood that monopolistic (oligopolistic) behavior will become
observable. All these measures possess significant limitations.
Among the many effects of monopoly, its influence on technolog-
ical progress is certainly one of the most important and perhaps the
most important. But no simple statement can be made about this
aspect of the problem. It would be hopeless to try to express the
influence of monopoly and competition on progress by the sort of
measure Lerner has used for a definition of monopoly in terms of its
effect on the allocation of resources on static assumptions. The effect
on progress presumably does not grow monotonically with the "de-
gree of monopoly" in the Lerner sense or in any other independently
meaningful sense. It is much more likely that the circumstances
most conducive to progress are characterized by some combination
of competitive market characteristics with monopolistic ones.
For fuller understanding of the bearing of competition on prog-
ress we should know more about the relationship between the re-
search efficiency (inventive efficiency) of the firm and its size. What
is even more important, given the research efficiency of the firm we
should have specific knowledge of the effect of monopoly and of
competition on the quality of foresight and on the strength of the
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profit-incentive. For, if all firms maximized their profits on correct
anticipations—including correct anticipations of the future rate of
technological progress—then the speed with which given inventions
are technologically introduced would be the same under monopoly
as under competition.' Monopoly and competition influence the
rate of progress by their effect on research efficiency, on the quality
of foresight, and on the responsiveness of firms to the profit stimulus.
In view of these circumstances, it would be unreasonable to look
for a "measure of monopoly" that would directly express the effect
of monopoly and of competition on progress; and any measure by-
passing this dynamic effect either is subject to the severe limitations
of static analysis or is a concentration measure in disguise rather
than a measure of monopolistic consequences. In empirical work it
seems preferable to experiment with measures of concentration,
rather than with measures of monopoly, by examining the question
of what behavior is observable in markets characterized by different
degrees of concentration.
Yet the difficulties standing in the way of the concentration-ratio
1Awell-known proposition maintains that in a competitive industry new-
comers enter with a new method (and force old firms to price below old total
costs, according to the new method) as soon as new total cost falls short of old
total cost, while a monopolist will adopt a new method only if new total cost is
lower than old variable cost. This suggests that progress is slower under monopoly.
But the proposition obviously implies that the competitive firms have wrong
foresight and that they suffer losses. If they had known that new firms would
enter with a new method, there would have been fewer firms in the industry,
with the result that during the lifetime of the equipment of each firm the total
cost would be recovered. During each such period(construction-to-scrapping
period) the competitive output would be greater than the monopolistic, but this
would merely express thestatic difference" between competition and monopoly.
The rate of progress (rate of increase of output) from one such period to the
next would not depend on the character of the market structure if laboratory
inventions were made at the identical rate, foresight were correct, and profits
were maximized under all market structures. It is true, however, that the length
of the construction-to-scrapping period may in certain circumstances depend on
the market structure. This is probably not a very significant qualification. The
essential pro position here is that with identical laboratory efficiency, perfect
foresight, and profit maximization, the difference between the monopolistic and
competitive output is merely the familiar difference developed by static equilib-
rium theory for each successive period. Aside from some complicating factors,
which have no room in a first approximation, there would in these circumstances
be no further difference such as would express itself in the growth or the diminu-
tion of the 'static difference" from one period to the next. Hence there would
l)e no difference in the rate of progress (cf. my discussion of this problem in the
Quarterly Journal of Economics, The Influence of Market Structure on Tech-
nological Progress," November 1951,pp.556-577 and "The Test Which Inven.
tions Must Pass: A Correction," May 1q52,pp.297-298).
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approach are very considerable, too. One of these is that the ap-
proach requires distinguishing groups of firms (industries) from one
another, in a fashion which implies a judgment on cross elasticities
of demand or of supply. Another difficulty is that some significant
consequences of monopoly cannot be measured in a way that permits
correlation analysis between concentration ratios and monopolistic
consequences. At best we can try to express the concentration char-
acteristics and some market results numerically, and add to this a
verbal discussion of the relationship between the numerical con-
centration characteristics and those aspects of market behavior that
lend themselves poorly to numerical description.
A concentration ratio in the conventional sense is always a single
"property" of an underlying function. The function expresses on
the ordinate the cumulated share2 of an increasing number of firms,
with the firms arrayed from the largest to the smallest along the
abscissa. For example, the share of the four largest firms is a single
property of such a function. Considering that in an analysis of the
effects of concentration on market results more than one property of
these functions may prove significant, the present practice of basing
the messures of concentration on a single property of the underlying
function may block fruitful avenues. It seems to me that a somewhat
fuller description of the characteristics of these functions could
convey a good deal more information, without significant loss of
simplicity.
Some convention of the following sort might, for example, prove
convenient. Express the share of the largest firm as one number;
list the number of the firms with shares exceeding, say, io per cent,
and make this your second number; express, as your third number,
the joint share of the firms with shares exceeding, say, so per cent;
and add or omit a parenthetical(s) sign at the end of the symbol,
depending on whether small firms with individual shares of less than,
say, i per cent, do or do not jointly account for more than io per
cent. For example, 20—3—52(s)would mean that the largest firm
has a share of 20 per cent, that the total number of firms with a
share of more than io per cent is three, that the joint share of these
three firms is 52 per cent, and that very small firms account for more
than io per cent of the total. A symbol of this sort is not essentially
more cumbersome than that which we habitually use for denoting
the day of the year, and yet some symbol of this general character
2 This may be the share in total output or in total employment or in any
other significant variable.
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may give a reasonably good picture of nearly the entire course of
the underlying concentration function. In our illustration we would
know that the share of the largest firm is 20 per cent, that the second
and the third largest firm have individual shares of between 12 per
cent and 20 per cent, and that firms which are very small and which
are fairly small in relation to the biggest firm in the group jointly
account for 48 per cent of the total. We would know also that the
joint share of the very small firms is not entirely negligible, but we
would not know the distribution as between "fairly small" and "very
small" firms. (If this further information were considered essential,
a fourth number could be added, in the parenthesis containing the
letter s, and this number would disclose the joint share of the very
small firms.)
If we could take it for granted that the underlying concentration
function (cumulated distribution) is mathematically always of the
same type, we might be able to summarize the essential properties
of the entire function by, say, the value of a constant in its equation
(or perhaps by the curvature of the function). M. A. Adelman dis.
cussed this question, along with other important ones, in his article
in the November 1951issueof the Review of Economics and Sta-
tistics. However, it seems unlikely to me that the same sort of func-
tion would fit reasonably well all or most of the concentration data.
This is why I believe that a description of the kind here suggested
might be more useful.
Scitovsky gave a constructive and revealing discussion of the rela-
tionship between measures of monopoly and measures of concentra-
tion on the one hand, and particular research objectives on the
other. His discussion strengthens my conviction that measures of
concentration, in spite of all their shortcomings, possess the ad-
vantage of being less specifically tailored to narrow objectives than
are our measures of monopoly. I believe that one of the present
shortcomings of measures of concentration would be reduced (per-
haps eliminated) if in these measures we could summarize several
essential properties of the underlying distribution.
CARL KAY5EN, Harvard University
SCIT0VsKY's paper provides a lucid classification of the effects of
concentration, and argues that measures registering only one of
SPossessinga share of less than ipercent.
4 Possessing a share of less than io per cent but more than i per cent.
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these effects—e.g. measures of profits, or measures of the discrepancy
between price and marginal cost—are not good substitutes for direct
measures of the number and size distribution of the competing
sellers (buyers) in the market. Thus, in his view, the application of
economic theory to the problem of measuring concentration sup.
ports the continuing attempt to find a good one-parameter summary
of the size distribution of the most "appropriate" variable within
the limits of the data. Scitovsky thinks this is sales.
This comment endorses a somewhat modified version of Sciov-
sky's conclusion, but on an entirely different view as to what eco-
nomic theory shows. The application of price theory to the problem
of the measurement of concentration suggests that more sophisticated
and precise measures than those provided by any one-parameter
summary of the size distribution of firms' sales are not worth the
trouble of definition and computation. A simple index of the sort
suggested can point to the existence of markets in which the presence
and effects of oligopoly deserve detailed study; no more sophisti-
cated measure calculable without such detailed study of the particu-
lar market can do any more.
This assertion rests on two bases. The first is provided by price
theory in general; namely, that the delimitation of the market in
which concentration is to be measured typically presents substantial
problems and cannot be solved by recourse to Census classifications
of industries or commodities. The market has both product and
geographic boundaries; in neither product space nor geographic
space are these boundaries sharp. To delimit the market in terms of
products requires examination of both the chain of potential sub-
stitutes at various prices as seen by buyers and the widening circle
of potential rival suppliers at various prices as seen by sellers. Simi-
lar problems arise in drawing the geographic boundaries of markets
for the many commodities for which production is localized and
transportation costs are significant. In general, the examination of
the power of sellers (or buyers) in any particular market reveals a
concentration of interrelated markets with influences of varying de-
grees of strength on the transactions in the particular commodity or
service under examination. The more important of these influences
must be included in defining the market relevant to the measure of
concentration. Otherwise, an index of concentration would not serve
to distinguish monopoly from product specialization.
The second basis of skepticism as to the utility of refined measures
of concentration arises from the present state of the theory of oh-
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gopoly. This objection is more fundamental than the previous one,
and would justify the standpoint of this comment if market bound-
aries always coincided with Census product definitions. Scitovsky
says: "Monopoly and oligopoly consist of the power relation among
the sellers or buyers in a certain market; and this power relation
depends largely on the number and size distribution of the compet-
ing sellers or buyers. Measures of concentration try to express the
number and size distribution of competitors in terms of a one-
parameter index, which could then be regarded as a direct measure
of the degree of oligopoly." The premise of this argument—that the
power relation depends chiefly on the number and size distribution
of competing sellers—must be denied. Many other features of the
market are relevant to this "power relation." At least the following
are of equal importance with the number and size distribution of
sellers in many market situations: the rate of growth of demand over
time, the character and speed of technological change, the degree
to which sellers operate in other markets, the extent and nature of
product differentiation, and the goals of individual firm policy—e.g.
profit maximization vs. security. The failure of oligopoly theory in
its present form to assist in the prediction of market behavior, or
even to provide a framework for investigating particular markets,
springs from its inability to take account of these and similar vari-
ables. It seems vain to expect that numbers and size distribution
alone will explain market behavior, and therefore equally vain to
hope for more from concentration measures than that they should
provide a preliminary basis on which resources for further study
should be allocated.
This comment is, of course, propaganda: propaganda for more
studies of the operation of particular markets, and for elaboration
of oligopoly theory to the point where it can begin to explain the
results of such studies.
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